Tuesday, August 27, 2013

2 dead in Georgia trench collapse. Unacceptable! OSHA investigating.


The Occupational Safety and Health Administration returned to Columbus Tuesday to continue gathering information into Monday's deadly trench collapse. 
OSHA tells News Leader 9's Roslyn Giles it is conducting a physical inspection of the work site at Summit Pointe where the trench gave way.  The crew was building an additional phase to the complex.
OSHA said it must complete its investigation within 6 months and issue any findings concerning whether any OSHA standards were violated.
The coroner confirms that James Jackson, 50, and Allen Thomas, 46, have died after being trapped in a trench at Summit Pointe Apartments on Williams Road.  They worked for the company Allen Development Group.
A 20-man rescue team tried to save the two construction workers trapped in a hole at the apartment complex's construction site, according to Fire Marshall Chief Ricky Shores. The men, who were relatives, were at the apartment complex constructing a new phase.
The men were using a tamp to pack in the dirt. Six people were in the trench at the time. Four escaped and tried to help the other men get out. Both bodies have been recovered and will be sent to Atlanta for an autopsy. A backhoe was used to shovel out the dirt. 
Jackson's son, Mike, was working with his father at the time. He was operating a backhoe when the incident occurred, and tried to help his family. 
Shores says the trench is 30 feet deep, but the men were trapped 12 feet under. He says they had to be careful because the composition of the soil, compaction of the soil, and lack of retaining walls could cause more victims

Monday, August 26, 2013

531 Texans lost their life on the job.


OSHA is swamped in too many accidents there.

http://www.keyetv.com/news/features/top-stories/stories/study-shows-big-jump-texans-dying-job-11767.shtml

OSHA Slams Home Depot for Repeat Safety Hazards

"By failing to correct previously cited deficiencies, Home Depot continues to dismiss a culture of safety as a priority," Deborah Zubaty, OSHA's area director for Columbus, Ohio, said in a statement. "Employers who are cited for repeat violations demonstrate a lack of commitment to worker safety and health." 

Corporate safety must conduct audits to see that one hazard is fixed in the rest of the stores.

http://www.11alive.com/rss/article/304126/166/Home-Depot-fined-150700-by-OSHA?URL=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.11alive.com%2Frss%2Farticle%2F304126%2F166%2FHome-Depot-fined-150700-by-OSHA

Friday, August 23, 2013

OSHA announces proposed silica rule

OSHA announces proposed silica rule. http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/osha/OSHA20131767.htm


ASSE Responds to OSHA’s Proposed Rule to Protect Workers Exposed to Crystalline Silica

Posted in  8 hours ago
This Statement is attributable to: Kathy A. Seabrook CSP, CMIOSH, EurOSHM, President, American Society of Safety Engineers
Now that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has moved forward rulemaking on a possible standard to address the occupational exposure to silica, the American Society of Safety Engineers (ASSE) looks forward to the opportunity to bring the expertise and experience of its member safety, health and environmental (SH&E) professionals to an open debate about the appropriate regulation of this risk.
Our members already manage successfully the risks posed by silica in practical, cost effective ways and work with employers committed to protecting workers from those risks.  By finally moving this rulemaking forward, the entire occupational safety and health community will have the opportunity to share best practices and varied perspectives on how best to protect workers from a risk that, despite advances in protecting workers from silica risks, still kills more than 150 workers and harms the health of thousands more every year.  Our hope is that this debate and the information shared can help encourage more employers to provide better protections to their workers as this rulemaking proceeds.

Thursday, August 22, 2013

OSHA sees fatality rate lower again.

Cheers to the hard working OSHA leaders, CSHOs, and staff that help set a new record of 3.2 fatalities per 100,000 workers. The previous team had flat lined for years at 4.0/100,000. This means an extra 700 workers came home last year vs. 2005.
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/cfoi.pdf

Sunday, August 18, 2013

"The employers' shocking decision to seal exit door" said Galen Lemke

This is a great OSHA quote on Fire Safety. "The employers' shocking decision to seal exit doors and block emergency exit routes to gain additional storage space placed the workers in great jeopardy," said Galen Lemke, director of OSHA's Honolulu Area Office, who said that the blocked exits could have devastating results in the event of an ammonia leak from piping located throughout the facility. "Employers must follow safety and health rules to prevent horrific tragedies, such as the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire in New York in 1911 when 146 workers died, unable to escape due to blocked exits. We hope to never see such a tragedy again, in Hawaii, or anywhere."

Emmett Roe of Imperial Foods went to jail in the 1990 as workers died in chicken procession plant because of locked exits.


https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=NEWS_RELEASES&p_id=24519

Friday, August 9, 2013

Wal-Mart Agrees to Upgrade Safety Policies At 2,900 Stores to Settle OSHA Charges

Somber thoughts about today's OSHA Walmart Settlement. They deleted some Serious Confined Space and Lockout citations. They made exit issue and storage issue to Other than Serous from Serious. Despite these killing hundreds over the years. They dropped the penalty from $239,000 to $190,000. There is extensive settlement language on the trash compactor lockout issue. Despite receiving dozens of violations including repeated violation, Walmart is not on the latest OSHA SVEP list of 7.1.2013. That doesn't make sense. There is something wrong when the largest retailer and one of the largest global companies keeps on getting cited over and over. I look at the OSHA data and I see 111 Walmart inspections with OSHA violations in the last five years. There are dozens of violations numbering over 100! Who has more OSHA affirmed citations than Walmart in the last five years? 111 sites with violations is not acceptable. Yet no SVEP? Yet repeat violations cited? Numerous complaint inspections? What is going on Walmart Corporate Safety? When is the largest retailer going to change?

From the PR today: “This settlement will help to keep thousands of exposed Wal-Mart workers safe and healthy on the job,” said Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health Dr. David Michaels. “We hope this sends a strong message that the law requires employers to provide safe working conditions, and OSHA will use all the tools at our disposal to ensure that all employers follow the law.”

Yet the statistic belie the problem. The cases get cited, settled, and over and over. OSHA needs to start thinking willful and deposition in these cases. This worked in the refineries, combustible dust and the grain sector. Walmart must be better, safer and provide a safe place of employment.

The SOL must decide to help. Too often they settle 99% of the contested cases because they say they are overwhelmed with the DOL backload of court cases. Remember the MSHA 10,000 cases in legal limbo? The Solicitor of Labor must get her staff to spend the resources to take some of the cases vs. settle over and over.



I got quoted in the recent Walmart OSHA settlement. The audit results should be public information when Walmart sends the reports to DEP. 

The settlement with Wal-Mart stands out from past corporate-wide deals in that it mandates that independent auditors inspect the stores, retired OSHA assistant regional administrator John Newquist told BNA. The agreement calls for audits at 80 percent of stores under federal jurisdiction every four months for the length of the two-year agreement. Newquist was not involved in the settlement.

http://www.bna.com/walmart-agrees-upgrade-n17179875748/

OSHA CSA link https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owasrch.search_form?p_doc_type=CWSA&p_toc_level=0


"As workers we routinely face inadequate fire safety measures, including blocked fire exits, and do not receive proper training on how to safely handle hazardous chemicals. Poorly maintained equipment, including balers and compactors, represent another hazard, made worse because these machines often lack appropriate mechanisms to ensure worker safety."

http://www.ufcw.org/2013/08/07/our-walmart-statement-on-osha-settlement-with-walmart/#sthash.QOGfibJy.dpuf

"In the wake of that senseless stampede that took a worker’s life, OSHA each year has reminded retailers to provide crowd control measures during major sales events. Wal-Mart’s corporate-wide settlement with the Labor Department does not mention Black Friday protection, but it should."

http://www.coshnetwork.org/wal-marts-worker-problems-do-not-end-labor-department-settlement


OSHA took a whipping on application of RAGAGEP in the BP-Husky decision just out.

OSHA took a whipping on application of RAGAGEP in the BP-Husky decision just out. Too many willful violations deleted. This will set back PSM enforcement 20 years. PSM training will have to be modified to reflect this decision. OSHA's needs to look honestly at the internal critics of the litigation from a couple years ago and look at certain VPP reports before spending time and resources to appeal.

Some quotes from the court decision.
Willful 1 was deleted.
"The Secretary’s flawed AVD dooms his case with respect to Willful Item 1. By couching the alleged violation in terms of the missing U-1 form, the Secretary impermissibly creates a significant requirement not found in the cited standard. The Secretary’s focus on the U-1 form is misplaced. BPP and BP-Husky cannot be found in violation of a standard for not possessing a document the cited standard does not require."

Willful Items 2-12 were deleted. However, the Secretary did not cite the companies for failing to comply with an alternative RAGAGEP, such as being outside acceptable limits set by BPP’s internal standards. The Secretary cited BPP and BP-Husky for exceeding 3% IPD, a prescriptive standard he impermissibly shoehorned into a performance standard. The Secretary is held to that violation description. Because the AVD improperly imposes a requirement on employers not found in the cited standards, the Secretary failed to establish BPP and BP-Husky were not in compliance with the appropriate RAGAGEP.
Items 2 through 12 are vacated.

Willful 13 & 14 were deleted
However, the Secretary did not cite the companies for failing to comply with an alternative RAGAGEP, such as being outside acceptable limits set by BPP’s internal standards. The Secretary cited BPP and BP-Husky for exceeding 3% IPD, a prescriptive standard he impermissibly shoehorned into a performance standard. The Secretary is held to that violation description. Because the AVD improperly imposes a requirement on employers not found in the cited standards, the Secretary failed to establish BPP and BP-Husky were not in compliance with the appropriate RAGAGEP.
Items 2 through 12 are vacated.

Willful 15a was deleted.
BPP emptied the pressure vessel and took it out of service in May of 2009, four months before OSHA began its inspection of the refinery. Thus, at the time of OSHA’s inspection, the undersized relief valve did not present a hazard while installed on the empty pressure vessel. Area director Yoksas conceded there was no hazard to employees posed by PSV-136 (Tr. 191). OSHA safety engineer Lay agreed that “[i]f the piece of equipment had been properly removed from service . . . that would have been no hazard” (Tr. 464-465). Item 15a is vacated

Willful 16b, 17b, 18b were deleted
As noted previously, § 1910.119(j)(5) does not require an employer to immediately shut down an operation and replace a deficient piece of equipment. The standard allows an employer to take interim measures to ensure safe operation of the equipment. The Secretary has adduced no evidence that BPP and BP-Husky’s interim measures failed to ensure safe operation of the equipment until the valves could be replaced during turnaround.
The Secretary has failed to establish violations of he cited standard. Items 16b, 17b, and 18b are vacated.

Willful 19a-27a were deleted
The Secretary argues BPP and BP-Husky should have known, through the exercise of reasonable diligence that the PRDs were missing. He contends that the cited pressure vessels were installed years before the PSM Standard was enacted and BPP should have detected at some point before the 2009 inspection that the cited heat exchangers lacked PRDs. CSHO Sternes agreed with Hasselbach, however, that it is difficult to discover the absence of PRDs by looking at the piping and IP&Ds (Tr. 845-846, 1598). Indeed, CSHO Sternes was at the Ohio refinery for two and a half months, five days a week, but he learned of the missing PRDs the same way BPP and BP-Husky did—by way of the December Middough report (Tr. 809, 843). The Secretary has failed to establish BPP and BP-Husky had constructive knowledge of the missing PRDs.
Items 19a through 27a are vacated.

Willful 28-30 were deleted
The Secretary has failed to establish BPP and BP-Husky were in noncompliance with § 1910.119(d)(3)(ii) with respect to the cited furnaces. The Secretary, through CSHO Jensen, is attempting to enforce as mandatory the recommended practices found in RP 556. The Secretary also is incorrectly interpreting RP 556 to require employers to install all of the safeguards listed in Table 1, rather than to select the individual safeguards best suited to the individual furnaces. Items 28, 29, and 30 are vacated.

Willful 31 was deleted
The Secretary has failed to establish BPP and BP-Husky were in noncompliance with the terms of §§ 1910.119(d)(3)(iii) and (e)(3)(i). OSHA did not conduct an independent investigation of the alleged violation, but instead attempted to piggyback onto an internal self-audit commissioned by BPP. BPP’s expert Wolf and its emergency response specialist Herman testified there was no credible risk that the fire water could be contaminated at the cited locations. Because there is no credible risk of hazard, there was no need for BPP’s PHA team to address the hazards of the process.
Items 31a and 31b are vacated

Willful 32-40 were deleted
The Secretary has failed to establish BPP and BP-Husky were in noncompliance with § 1910.119(e)(5). The companies had documentation of the refinery’s facility siting program and the progress being made on it. The Secretary failed to show that the refinery’s extensive project for building, moving, and remodeling its facility, using the inside-out strategy for risk assessment, was not done in a timely manner.
Items 32 through 40 are vacated.

Willful 41 was changed to serious
BPP added a riser to the water tanks that can feed the FCC Feed Drum to prevent and overflow of water into it. BPP also increased the management review and approval required for continued operation of the valves and the FCC Feed Drum. It also installed a full sized relief valve in an interim location that could be installed without incurring the risks associated with a shutdown of the equipment (Tr. 2987, 2992, 3053). There is no evidence of BPP or BP-Husky having a heightened awareness of illegality regarding the relief valves.
The undersigned determines the Secretary’s classification of willfulness is not appropriate for BPP and BP-Husky’s violations of § 1910.119(d)(3)(ii) and reclassifies the violations as serious.

All the OSHA people put their heart and soul in the case. You can't ask anymore than that. I just hope they continue to improve the sector in process safety and share the lessons with the interested parties. Court is a fickle wind and no one can ever predict its out come.

Hello, Here is an intro and some OSHA Acronyms

Hello, I know many cannot use facebook for several reasons, so I am putting some thoughts on OSHA here also. 

A couple of people have asked me about the acronyms we use, so I've decided to list them here. I'll add to them as needed.

5(a)(1) - General Duty Clause of the OSH Act
ACGIH - American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienist
AAD - Assistant Area Director (OSHA)
AD - Area Director (OSHA)
ALJ - Administrative Law Judge
AO - Area Office (OSHA)
API - American Petroleum Institute
ARA - Assistant Regional Administrator (OSHA) (This is what I am. In my Region, I have repsonsibilty for State plan over sight of MI, MN, and IN, Consultation oversight, Training, Harwodd Grants, VPP, Alliances, Partnership, Tracking)
ARRA - American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
AVD - Alleged Violation Description
BLS - Bureau of Labor Statistics
CDC - Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CSHO - Compliance Safety & Health Officer
DOL - Department of Labor
FIRM - Field Inspection Reference Manual
FOIA - Freedom of Information Act
FOM - Field Operations Manual
FTA - Failure to Abate (violation classification)
HAZCOM - Hazard Communication standard - 29 CFR 1910.1200
IH - Industrial Hygienist
LEP - Local Emphasis Program
MOU - Memorandum of Understanding
MSDS - Material Safety Data Sheet
MSHA - Mine Safety and Health Administration
NCFLL - National Council of Field Labor Locals
NEP - National Emphasis Program
NFPA - National Fire Protection Association
NIOSH - National Institute of Occupational Safety & Health (part of CDC)
OSHRC - Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission
OSH Act - Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970
OSHA - Occupational Safety and Health Administration
OTI - OSHA Training Institute
OTS - Other Than Serious (violation classification)
PEL - Permissible Exposure Limit (OSHA)
PMA - Petition to Modify Abatement
PSM - Process Safety Management
R - Repeat (violation classification)
RA - Regional Administrator (OSHA)
REL - Recommended Exposure Limit (NIOSH)
RO - Regional Office (OSHA)
RSOL - Regional Solicitor of Labor
S - Serious (violation classification)
SOL - Solicitor of Labor
SST - Site Specific Targeting
TL - Team Leader (What I call an AAD usually GS-13) 
TLV - Threshold Limit Value (ACGIH)
TARP - Troubled Asset Relief Program
TWA - Time Weighted Average
VPP - Voluntary Protection Program
W - Willful (violation classification)